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A. Introduction 
qh~ 1988 Basel Accord was adopted JS ~ mc;ms of 
acluevmg two prunary objeCtives namely: I 
-"To help strengthen the soundness and stability of 
the mternanonal bJnkmg system. ThiS would be facili-
tated where International bankmg org.1n153tions were 
encourK~ged to supplement thetr capital positions. 
-To nutlg.1te competitive inequalities" 
The frnmework W:lS not only oriented towards 
increasing the sensitivity of regulatory capital dif-
ferences in risk profiles which exist within banking 
organisations, but WJS aho aimed at discouraging the 
retention of liquid, low risk assers.2 Furthermore, it was 
designed to take imo express considei'Jtion, off balance 
sheet exposures when assessments of capital adequacy 
are undertaken.3 
Ten years following the conclusion of t he agree-
ment on the 191\R :\ ccord , a Working Party was 
established to evaluate the impact and Jchievements 
of the Basel Accord. Two prmcipal 1ssues which were 
rak.-n IntO consideration by the Working Parry were:4 
Firstly, whether some banks have been encouraged 
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to hold higher capital ratios than would have been 
the cJse if th <> adoption of fi xed minimum capital 
requirements had not occurred Jnd. whether an 
increase in capi tal or reduction of lending has resu lted 
in Jny increast.> in r~tiosK Secondly, an ev~ luation of 
the impact of ftXcd cap1ta l requirements on reduced 
risk taking by banks, 111 relat1011 to capital, was also to 
be undertaken. 
In response to the first ISSue, relatmg to whether an 
introduction of fixed llllllllllum cap1t .. 1l requirements 
has led to banks mauuauung lughcr cap1tal rauos, some 
stud1es wh1ch were undertaken. re\·ealed that cap1tal 
standards, when strictly adhered to. compelled weakly 
cap11ahsed banks to consolidate thetr capital rat1os. 5 In 
response to whether banks adJUSted thei r capital ratios 
to comply with requirements through an increase in 
cap1tal or a reduction of mk-weighted assets, research 
revealed that banks responded to pressures stemming 
from capital ratios, in ~ way which they perceived to 
be most cost cffcctivc.0 Result> obtJined in response 
to an evaluation of the impact of capital requirements 
on risk rak ing were inconcl usiw.7 The data av:Jibblc 
fo r purposes of measuring b;mk 1·isk tJki llF;, were not 
only limited, bm also complica ted the task of making 
an evaluation thcrcof.8 
O ther issues which were difficult to evaluate 
included whether an introduction of minimum capital 
requirements for banks were detrimental to their com-
petitiveness and whether the Basel :\ ccord facilitated 
competitive inc.-qual1t1CS among;t banks.q These evalu-
ative d1fficulues, respecnvely. were attnbuted firstly, to 
the fact that "long term compet1m·eness of bankmg" 
depends on a \'Jnery of f.1ctors-most of wh1ch are not 
connected to regulanon and secondly, to the a\':ulable 
ev1dence at the nme-wh1ch \\':IS mconclliSI\·e-and 
hence, not sufficiently pcrsuasi\'C.IO 
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I. Amenanents to the I 988 Accord 
The Fam Consultam·e Paper- The Three Pallar 
Model 
In June I 9W, as a means of replacing the 1988 Basel 
Accord, the first consultative paper (on a new capital ade-
quacy framework) was issued by the Basel Conm1ittee 
on Bankang Supervas ion. T he First Consultative Paper 
iamoduccd the "three pillar" model which comprises 
of"thc aninimum capita l requirements''-rhat attempt 
to consolidate the ru les established in the 1988 Accord, 
"supervisory review" and " market discipline"- "as a 
lever co strengthen disclosure and encourage safe and 
sound banki11g practices". II Whilst acknowledging that 
the 1988 Accord l1ad " helped to strengthen the sound-
ness and stabi lity of the international banking system 
and enhanced competitive equality among internation-
ally active banks", it was added that the new framework 
provided by the ftrst consultative paper was "designed 
to better alagn regulatory capital requirements to 
underlying risks and to recognise the improvements to 
rask measuremcm12 and control." 
One of the flaws mherent m the 1988 Basel .\ccord 
was namd)•. the fact that it re,varded risky lending since 
It requared banks to set asade the same amount of capatal 
against loans to shaky borro\vers as against those with 
better credats. IJ Apan from the fact that capital require-
ments \vere JUSt reasonably related to b:mk's risk taking, 
the credat exposure requtrement \vas the same regardless 
of the aedit rating of the borrower.14 Furthermore, the 
capiml requiremem for credit exposure often depended 
on the exposure's leg.1l form-for instance, an on-bal-
ance sheet loan was generally subject to a higher capital 
rcqui remclll than an off-balance sheet to the same 
borrower. IS In addition to such insensi tivity r.o risk, 
anothct· problem which resulted from Basel 2 was the 
unwi ll ingness of banks to invest in better risk manage-
met It systems. 
II. Capital Arbitrage 
A general crincasm of Basel I rdates to the fact that it 
promoted capital arbitrage. This is attributed to its wide 
nsk ca tegon es whach provide banks with the laberty to 
"arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk 
and the regulatory capatal requarements."I6''Regulawry 
cap1t.1l arbttragc "ul\'oh·cs the practice by banks of" using 
secunttsatton to alter the profile of thear book and may 
pl'()(hKc the effect of malung the bank's capital ratios 
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appear in8ated.l7 Such a prawce JUmfics the extension 
of regulatton to the securities markets- rather than 
being merely confined to the field of banking. 
Four principal types of adcntified capital arbitrage 
include: 18chcrry packmg. secuntisataon wath partial 
recourse, remote origination and indirect credit. 
Ill. Basel II 
Some of the key f.1ctors which instigated the intro-
duction ofBascl 2 includc: l9 
"Changes in the m ucturc of cap ital markets-resulting 
in the need for the incorporation of increased competi-
tivt>ness of credit marke t~ in capital requirements 
The net'd for measures wl1ich would facilitate the 
eradica tion ofin efllciencies in lending markets 
Explosave debt levels which w.-re generated during 
the economic upturn.'' 
Under Basel II , and Ill response to the fact that 
the measurement of mmu11um capttal \\-:Js prenously 
based on a gcn~ral assessment of nsk dispersion which 
dad not correspond to spec 1fic ca rcumstances of anda-
vidual institutions. cretht mstttutions will be required 
to rer.un more captt:ll af requa red. Under Pallar I. the 
definition of capital and nunimurn capital coefficient 
remain unchanged-however, credat msututions wall be 
required to retain more capital if their individual risk 
situation so dcmands .20 Further advancements under 
Basel II are illustrated in the areas of risk measurements. 
The measmement methods for credit risk are more 
sophisticated than was prev iously the case. For the first 
time, a means of measlll"ing operational risk has been 
set out.21 Under Pillar O ne, credit and market risk are 
supplemented by operational risk-which is to be cor-
roborated by capitaJ.22 
B. Basel Committee's Proposals to Strengthen 
Global Capital and Liquidity Regulations 
I. Objectives of the Basel Committee's Proposals 
to Strengthen Global Capital and Uquidity 
Regulationsn 
"As well as strengthenmg glob.1l capt tal and laquadaty 
regubtions (wluch would ulumatcly facilitate a more 
resilaent bankang sector). the Basel Conunmee 's reforms 
are aimed towards unprovmg the banking sector's 
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ability to absorb s hocks arising fro m financial and eco-
no mic stress-hence mitiga ting spil l over risks from the 
financial secto r to the real econo my. 
T he Conunirree is also striving towards the improve-
ment o f risk management and governance as well as 
strengthen banks' tra nsparency and disclosures:' 
II. Key elements of the Basel Committee's proposals 
T he qua lity, co nsistency, and transparency o f capital 
base will be raised to ensure that brge, internatio nally 
active banks are in a better positio n c.o absorb losses 
o n bo th a go ing concern and gone concern basis. (For 
example, under the current Basel Conunittee standard , 
banks could hold as little as 2% commo n eqllity co risk-
based assets, befo re the applicatio n of key regulatory 
adjustments) . 
-As well as recommending an increase in che qua lity, 
consistency and transparency of capital base24, che Basel 
Committee's recognition of the fact char. " insufficient 
detail on the components of capital"'25 render "accu-
rar.e assessment of irs quality or a meaning comparison 
with othe r banks difficult" , infers its acknowledgement 
of the import.ance attribur.ed to enhanced disclosures. 
Furthe rmo re, the increased importance attached to the 
role of central counter parties in effo rts aimed at reduc-
ing syste mic risks sho uld also facili tate the process o f 
achieving grea ter and more enhanced disclosures. 
T he risk cove rage of rhe capital framework will 
be strengthened. In addi tion co the trading book and 
securitisatio n refo rms anno unced in July 2009, the 
Committee pro poses the consolidation of the capital 
requirements fo r counte rparty credit risk exposures 
arising fro m deriva tives and securities finan cing activi-
ties. T hese enha 1~cemenrs are aimed at strengthe ning 
the resilie nce of individual banking inst.itutions and 
1·educing the l"isk o f shocks being transmitted fro m 
one institttt.io n to another through the derivatives and 
financing channe l. Consolidated COlHHerparty capital 
requirements sho uld increase incentives to transfer 
O T C derivative e:xposures to cemral co unterparties and 
exchanges. 
However there is also a limit to what the capital 
framework could address . As highlighted by the recent 
crisis, capital requireme nts 011 their own, were insuf-
ficient in addressing liquidi ty and fimding problems 
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which arose during rhe cns1s. The importance of 
enhanced disclosures is also re flected and e mbodied 
wi thin the Conm1icc.ee's second objecc.ive in relat.io n to 
its pi"Oposal co strengthe n rhe 1·esilience o f rhe banking 
sector, tha t is, its endeavours "to improve risk man-
agement a nd governance as we ll as strengthe n banks' 
transparency and disclosures:' 
As a result of the inability of bank capital adequacy 
require ments, o n their own, co address funding and 
liquidity problems26, the need to focus o n PiUar 3 of 
Basel ll, namely, market discipline, is becoming mo re 
apparent. T here is g rowing justification fo r g reater 
measures a imed at extending capital rules co the secu-
rities m~rketsK T his nor only ~rises f1"0m increased 
conglomeratio n and glo balisat.ion-which increases 
risks attribmed to syste mic contagio n, bm also the fact 
that " the g loba lisatio n of financial markets has made it 
possib le for investors and capital seeki ng companies to 
switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated 
markecs."2.7 Furthermore, it is no t o nly argued that , the 
fact that many banks in a mm1ber of countries have 
chosen c.o securit.ise assets is probably largely due c.o the 
capital req uirements imposed on them", but also that 
present ru.les do no t ,explicitly cover risks ocher chan 
credit ~nd marke t risk ."28 
T he engagement o f market partiCipants in the 
corpo rate reporting process, a process which would 
consequently enhance market discip line, consti tmes a 
fundamental means whereby greater measures aimed at 
facilita ting prudential supe rvision, could be extended 
to the securities markets. T hrough PiUar 3, market par-
ticipan ts luke credit. agencies can der.ermine the levels 
o f capital retained by banks-hence their potential to 
rectify or exacerbate pro cyclical effects resulting from 
Pillars J and 2. T he challe nges enCOllll tered by mi ll~rs J 
and 2 in addressing credit risk is reflected by pro blems 
idemifled with pro cyclicaUty, which a1-c attributed to 
banks' extremely sensit.ive internal credit risk models, 
and the leve l o f capiml buffe rs which should be retained 
under Pillar Two. Such issues justify the need to g ive 
greate r pro minence to Pillar 3. 
As a result. of the intlue nce and potential of market 
participants in deternuning capital levels, such market 
participants are able c.o assist. regulato rs in managing 
more effectively, the imp~cr of syste nuc risks which 
occur whe n le nding crite ria is tigl1r.ened owing to Basel 
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ll's procyclical effects. R egulators are able to respo nd 
and to manage with g reater efftciency, systemic risks to 
the financial system d uring pe riods whe n firms w hich 
arc highly leveraged become reluctant tO lend. This 
being partic ularly the case whe n such firms decide to 
c ur. back on le nding activities, and the decisio ns of suc h 
fir ms canno t be j ustified in sitttat.io ns where such fir ms' 
credit risk models are extremely sensitive-hence the 
level of capital being retained is actually much higher 
than minimum regulatory Basel capital rcquircmc ms.29 
T he European Cemra l Bank's repo rt. o n "Credit. 
Default Svvaps and Counter Party Risk" identifies 
asynmtetrical in formatio n as constituting a challenge 
for non-dealer market participants since in its view, 
price info rmatio n is c urrently limited, as dea ler prices 
are typically set o n a bi lateral basis and are not avai lable 
to no n-dealers.3° Furthermo re, the R.epo rt. also identi-
fies the role played by credit default svvaps in the recent 
fmancial crises, highlights the contributio n of counter 
risk management in the collapse of Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brmhers, and also the challe nges relating to 
the management. o f counter parry risk exposures w hich 
arise fro m C redit Default Swaps (CDSs) and o ther 
("over the counter") OTC derivat.ives.31 
Furthermore, the ECD recently highlighted that "no 
disclosure requ iremems currently exist within the IASB 
accounting standards with respect. to the mai n counter-
parts for de~ivatKive transact.io ns:' [t also states that "added 
disclosures for large counter parties and those that exceed 
certain thresholds would be useful in o rder to enable 
market parricipants to better assess their cowJterp:mrn 
r isk and the po tential for systemic sp ill over effecrs: ' 
T he Basel Committee will introduce a leverage 
ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk 
based framework with a view to changing to a Pillar 1 
trea tment based on appropriate review and cal ibratio n. 
This sho uld help to contain the build up of excessive 
leverage in the banking syst.em, imroduce addi tional 
safeguards against attempts to "game" the risk based 
requirements, and help address model risk. In ord er to 
e nsure comparability, the details o f the leverage mtio are 
to be harmo nised internatio nally.-making full adjust-
ments for res idual accounting differe nces. 
T he Cotlmlittee will introduce a series of measures 
aimed at promo ting the build up of capital buffers 
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during good times- which could be drawn upon 
during periods of stress. A counter cyclical capital 
framework will contribute to a more stable banking 
system whic h wi ll help dampen, instead of amplify, eco-
no mic and fin ancial shocks. [n additio n the Committee 
w ill be promo ting a mo re forv,;ard looking provisio ning 
which is based on expected losses, and which captures 
actual losses with g reater transparency and wh ich is also 
less pro cyclical than the present model (the " inc urred 
loss" provisio ning model). 
As was highlighr.ed under the introducto ry section, 
the pro motio n of financial stability through more risk 
sensitive capital requirements, constitutes one of Basel 
ll 's primary objectives.33 H owever some problems 
ide mif1cd wi th Basel ll are a.mibuted w pro cyclica lity 
and to the fact that not all material credit risks in the 
trad ing book are adequately accounted for in the cur-
rent capit.al requirements.34 T he pro cyclical nature of 
Basel ][ has been criticised s ince "capital requirements 
for credit risk as a pro bability of def.1ult of an expo-
sure decreases in the econo mic upswing and increases 
during the downtmn"35-bence resulting in capir.al 
req ui rements w hich fluctua te over the cycle. O the r 
identified36 consequential effects include the f.1ct that 
fluctuations in such capital requirements may result 
in credit institmio ns raising their capital during pe ri-
ods when its is costly for them to imple me nt such a 
rise-whic h has the potential o f inducing banks to cur 
back o n their lending. It is concluded that "risk sensi-
tive capital requirements sho uld have pro cyclical effectS 
principally on unde rcapitalised banks."37 
Accord ing to the Financ ia l Stability Fo rum (FSF), an 
earlier recognitio n of loan losses, which could have been 
facilitated by relevant disclosures abour loan loss provi-
sioning, could have reduced pro cyclical effects which 
occurred during the recent c risis.38 No t only does the 
FSF propose that amendments be made to the Basel ][ 
fi·amework-ame ndmenrs which are aimed at reducing 
banks' disincentives to increase their level of provisions 
for loan losses, it is also of the o pinion that measures 
aimed at improving market discipline could also help 
in reducing procyclicality and dive rsity.39 Furthermore, 
incemives which would encomage banks to retain 
liquidity could be introd uced-however , such incen-
tives should be g ranted w hilsr. striving to comply with 
the aims and o bjectives of Basel-particularly those 
aimed at enhancing a regulatory framework which is 
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more aligned with economic and regulatory capital. :\ s 
acknowledge(! by the Basel Commmee, .,certam uJCen-
tivcs which assume the form of capital reductions are 
cons1dered to 1mposc mmunum operational standards 
in recognition that poor management of operational 
mks (includmg legal risks) could render sucb nsk miri-
ganrs of cffccuw ly lmle or no v:~lue and that although 
parual mmgauon 1s rewarded. banks w11l be required 
to hold capital agaum residual risks", Hence incentives 
should also adequately accowlt for situatio ns where 
poor management systems may operate in institutions 
which are supposed to haw risk mitigants. 
As well as drawing attention to the fact that capital 
buffers may not actually mitiga te the cyclica I effects of 
bank regubtion;lO I'Cgulatoi'S arc also advised to give 
d11 c consideration to the eflecrs of risk weights on bank 
porrfolio behaviour when implementing regulations. 
As its fifth proposal, a global minimlUn liquid-
ity standard for internationally active banks is to be 
introduced by the Committee. This will include a 
30 day liquid1ty CO\'erage ratio requu-ement which is 
underpinned by a longer term strucmralliqllidity ratio. 
The fram ework w11l also mcorporate a common set of 
monitoring metrics to ass1st supervisors in their analy-
SIS and 1denuflcauon of mk trends. both at the bank 
and system w1de lewl. Such standards and monitoring 
metnc. w1ll serve to supplement the Basel Conunittee's 
Pnnc1ples for Sound L1qllld1ty R1sk Management and 
SuperVISIOn. 
Ill. Other poinu highligiJted by the Committee 
The rcv1ew of the need for additional capital, 
liquidity or other supervisory measures aimed at reduc-
ing externaliti es genernted by systemica lly important 
institutions. 
Recognition that severity of the economic and 
financia l crisis is attributed to the fact that exces-
sive on- and off-balance sheet leverage had been 
accumulated by banking sectors of many countries 
whilst many banks were retaining insufficient liquid-
ity buffers. Consequences resulting from this include 
the inabi lity of the banking system to absorb the 
resultmg systemiC tradmg and credit losses . Further, 
the banking system was unable to manage the "re 
intermediation" of large off balance exposures which 
had accumulated. 
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Aggravation of the crisis owing to pro cyclical effects 
and the Interconnectedness of S}''Stenuc lllS!ItUtiOUS-
such interconnectedness being triggered by a range of 
complex transacuons. 
Systenuc mks ami the central role ~tuned by banks 
in relation to liquidity serws as greater 
justification for regulation with respect to ba11ks. 
"The fundamental role of banks in the maturity trans-
formation of short-term depoSits into long-term loans 
makes banks inherently vulnerable to Liquidity risk, 
both of an institution-specific natu re and that which 
affects markets as a whole."41 
[n relation to the sccuritie> markets, information 
asymmetry appea r~ to constitute a greater basis for 
t-egulation. Howevt>r, the existence of information 
asymmetry wi th in the ba nking42scc tor has the poten-
tial to genernte systemic effects within the banking 
sector--consequences whose eflects, it could be said, 
could have g1-eater 1-epe-rcussions than if such were to 
originate from witlun the secunrics markets. 
The link between liqtudity and system1c nsks as 
iUusrrated in the ECB's Financial Stability Review. is 
attributed to the "destruction of specific knowledge43 
which banks have abom the1r borrowers and the 
reduction of the common pool of hqtudlty."44 The 
importance of the lmk between hq111d1ty mks and 
systemic risks witlun the bankmg sector IS lughl1ghted 
by the consequences atmbmcd to the reluctance of 
banks to retain liquidity-gi,·cn the cost of holding 
liquidity.H The consequentia l shortf.1lls of liq\nd-
ity as reflected by on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches accentuates the importance of the role 
assumed by central banks in the funding of bank bal-
ance sheets.46 
I. Mitigating the Procyclical Effects of Basel II 
According to a repon ,47 the two princ.ipal solu rions 
which have been e ndor~ed by the Turner Review and 
the DeLarosiere Report, and which arc considered 
to have the potemial to reduce pro cyclical effects48 
induced by the CRD and Bast.' I II , include: 1) The 
requirement that banks "hold bigger reserves during 
good times-hence limiting credit and risk expan-
sion in good times and storing up capit.tl to be used 
during bad times" (2) " Increasing risk-wc1ghting on a 
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range of assets because th is also restricts balance sheer 
exp~ns1on"K 
Ano ther propos.1l put fom o;ml as an optimal means 
of recnfya ng Basel II 's procychcal effecrs-as illustrated 
through the "amphficanon of bus1ness C)cle tluc-
manons". mvo lves the ut1hS..1t10n of a "bus111ess cycle 
multiplier of the Basel II capital requi re ments thar is 
increasmg 111 the rate o f grov.th o f the C OP" . Under 
such a scheme, it is argued. riskier " banks would face 
higher capita l requ irements Without rcgtalation exacer-
bating credit bubbles and crunches."49 
O the r mechanisms provided under the CRD as 
means o f mit igating pro cycl icality within the capital 
req uirements framewo rk in clude:SO 
T he use o f dowmurn Loss Given Default (LGD) 
estimates, PO estimates be ing based o n lo ng data series, 
technical adjtlstment' made tO the ri,k weight ftmc-
tion, stress testing requ irements and Pilbr 2 supervisory 
revi~w proccsK~K It is aclmowlcdged. however. :hat more 
measures may be required to mitigate the procyclical 
effects o f the capital requ irements framework. O ptions 
provided include those aimed at reducing its cyclical 
n sk sensitiVIty, measures wh1 ch enhance Its r i!ik capn1re. 
and the 1nrennonal mtroducuo n of colmter-cyclical 
buffers (compnsmg capital and / or proviSio ns). 
2. Finandal Stability Forum Recommendorions 
Aimed at Mitigating mrocycf~ealtty 
11 irs repon SI on "Address1ng Procyclical.ry in the 
Fmanc1al Syste m". the F1nanc1:ll Stab1hty Fo rwn's rec-
o mmendations to nmigate mechanisms thar ampl ifY 
procycl1calaty was extended to three areas:S2 
(1) bank capitJ l framewo rk. ii) bank loan los.-. p rovi-
sio ns as well as iii) leverage and v:Jluatio n issues. 
A summary of the recomme ndatio ns relating to cap-
ita l, as prov ided in the 1\ cport of the Financial Stabi lity 
Forum is as fo llows ;53 
"That the Basel Com1n ittee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) should stren~hen the regulatory capital 
framework so that the quality and level of capital 
in the banking system increase during stror.g eco-
nomic conditions and can be drawn down during 
periods o f economic and financial stress; 
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Thar the BC BS sho uld revise the market risk frame-
work of Basel II to re<lure the rcl1an ce on cycl1cal 
VAR- based capital estimates; 
The BCBS sho uld supplement the nsk- bascd 
capiral requirement tit~ a s1mplc, non-nsk based 
measure to help comam the bu1ld- up of Je,·erage 
in the banking system and pllt a floor under the 
Basel II framework; 
Superv1sors sho uld usc the l3ascl Con\J Juctee's 
e nhanced srress resting practices as a cr itical part o f 
the Pillar 2 >upervisory review pnxcs> to vJ lidatc the 
adequacy o f banks' capital buffers above the minimum 
regulato ry capi ta l req uirement;" 
"Tha t the BCBS sho uld mo nito r the impact o f the 
Basel II framework and nuke ap p1'0priatc adjustments 
to dam pen excessive cycl icali ty o f the minimum capital 
req uj ren1ents;'' 
"That the BC BS carry out regular asscssmenb of the 
risk coverage o f the capiul framework in relation to 
fmanc1al developments and banks' evolvi ng risk profiles 
and make timely enhancements." 
3. Risk Management ond Governance 
''Stress tesnng IS anunpo1tam rask m;anagcment tool-
particularly for counter parry m k managemenr."H 
Accord1ng to the Basel Commmee,SS " as pubhc 
disclosure incrc:ases certainry 111 the market, 1mproves 
transparency, f.1c1l11ates valuanon. and st re ngthens mar-
ket discipline, it is important that banks publ icly 
disclose mformanon on a regular bas1s that enables mar-
ker participants 10 make info rmed decisions abo ut the 
soundness o f the ir lictuidi ty ri~k 111anagcmcnt framewo rk 
and liquidity position ."Thc inv'O lvcment o f market par-
ticipants in the proccs:. whereby the Comm ittce strives 
to f.1cilirare market disc ip line thi'Ough the develo pment 
o f "a set o f d isc losure rcqu ircmcnts which will all ow 
such market. participants to assess key pieces o f in fo rma-
tio n o n the scope o f applicat io n, capita l, r i; k exposui'CS, 
risk assessment processes, and hence capital adequacy 
o f an instination"56 constitutes a vital means whereby 
effective corporate governance could be f.1cili tated. 
R ecent reports have revea led the lack of knowledge 
demonstrated by financial institmions in rel:ation to risks 
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involved when engaged With "businesses and structu red 
credit producrs."57 The f.1et that b~nks "did not adhere 
to the fundamental tenets of sound fmancial judgement 
and prudent nsk management" was also lughl1ghted.S8 
Greater efforts have been undertaken to uwolve 
market pam c1pants by encouraging them to assess a 
b.1nk's mk profile. Such proacuve e£forts are more desir-
able than "allow111g markets to evolve ~nd decide.''59 .\ s 
identified by the Onscl Conunittee. " improvements in 
risk management must evolve to keep pace With rapid 
financial innov.uion.60 Furthermore. it states that" this is 
particularly relevant for participants in evolvi11g a11d rap-
id ly growing businesses.bl lnnov.J tion hns incrensed the 
complexity and potential illiquidity of structured credit 
products-which in turn, could m~ke such products 
not only more difllcult to va luc ami hedge, but also lead 
to inadvertent increases in overall risk.''62 " Further, the 
increased growth of complex investor specific products 
may result in th in markets that a.·e illiquid- which could 
expose a bank to large losses in times of stress, if the asso-
ciat<:'d risks arc not well understood and managed in a 
timely and cfl'ccove 1mnner. Stress tests have been iden-
tified as means whereby investors'uncert.l inty about the 
qua !try of bank balance sheets, could be eLnunated. 63 
The Comnuttce's acknowledgement of negative 
mccnti\'CS ansmg &om rhe use of e:~o"tcrnal ranngs to 
determine regulatory cap1tal reqUirements and proposals 
to nungate these mcenu,·es 1>1 IS well-founded- how-
ever, regulators will also be able to manage. with greater 
abllu:y. systemiC m ks to tbe linat1C1al system during 
such periods when firms wl11ch are highly Je,·eraged 
become reluctant to lend where more market partici-
pants such as credit rating ngencies. could be engaged 
in the supervisory proccss.65 T he :\nnex to Pro cycli-
cality in the Accompanying Document amending the 
Capital R.cquircmcnts Dircctiw66 not only importantly 
emphasises the f.1ct that regulatory capital requirements 
do not constitute the sole determinants of how much 
capital bauks should hold. bLit also highlights the role of 
credit rating agencies in compelling banks to increase 
tht>ir capital levels even where such institution may be 
complying with regulatory requirements. 
Further as n ghtly acknowledged by the Conunittee, 
" recent experience has shown that banks' internal 
credit models have not performed well. Permitting 
banks to usc thc1r own mternal models to estimate the 
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capital requirements for secunrisat1 on exposures could 
increase pressure to permit the use of such modds in 
Base! II more broadly. Thus, wlulc there ha\'C been con-
cerns expressed about the usc of external ratmgs under 
the Basel II framework, including that reliance on 
external ratmgs could undern11ne mccml\'es to conduct 
independent internal nssessments of the credn qual-
ity of exposures, the removal of external ranngs from 
the Basel I[ framework could ra1se addtnonal tssues for 
determining regulatory capital requirements. "67 
C. Conclusion 
As well ns the inability of bank capital adequacy 
requiremen.ts, on their own, to address funding and 
liquidity problems, the need for greater focus on Pillar 
3 of Basel II , namely, market disc ip line, and growing 
justifica tio1~ for greater mcasttrcs aimed at extending 
capital rules to the securi ties mat·kets, are factors which 
are becoming more apparent. 
Even though markets should be allowed to evolve, 
checks and controls should exist to ensure that such. 
market act ivities are effect1w ly managed and con-
trolled. Management information sy..tcms (MIS) and 
banks' credn risk models should be flextble (and not 
overly sensi rive) in order to adapt to the e\·olving mar-
ket whilst prov1dmg for some clement of control. The 
Basel Commmee furthermore, acknowledges the role 
asswned by management mformauon systems and risk 
management processes 111 aSSIStlllg the bank "to ldenuf)-
and aggregate similar risk exposures across the firm, 
includmg legal entitles, and asset rypes (cg loans, denva-
rives and Hn.cw red products)."68 
The operation of risk lll ltigants in bank institu-
tions does not justify a reduction in the capital levels 
ro be retained by such banks-since banks operating 
with risk mitigants could sti ll be considered inefficient 
operators of their management information system~ 
(M !S), intcm al control systems, and risk man~gement 
processes. T he fact that bauks pos~css risk mitigants 
does not 11ecessarily imply that they are complying 
wi th Basel Core Principles for effecti ve supcrvisio1  
(particularly Core Principles 7 and 17). Core Principle 
7 nor only stipulates that "b~nks and banking groups 
satisfy supervisory requirements of a comprehensive 
management process, ensure that this tdentifies. evalu-
ates, monitors and controls or miugates allmaten al risks 
and ass~ses rhetr overa ll capital adequacy 1n relation to 
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their risk profile, but that such processes correspo nd 
to the size and complexity of t.he institution." Cerrain 
incenr.ives which assume the form of capital reductions 
are considered by the Basel Conu11ittee ro " impose 
minimum operational standards in recognit.ion that 
poor managemenr. of opera tional risks (including legal 
risks) could render such risk mitiganrs of effectively 
little or no value and that altho ugh parr.ial nutigat.ion is 
rewarded, banks w ill be required to hold capital aga inst 
residual risks". 
Information disclosure should be encouraged for 
several reasons, among;t which include the fact that 
imperfect informat.ion is considered to be a cause 
of market fa ilure--which " reduces t.he maxinusation 
po temial of regulatory compet.ition", and also because 
disclosure requi rements would contribute ro the reduc-
tion of risks which could be generated when granting 
reduced capital level revvards ro banks who may have 
poor managemenr. systems. 
Response to Consultative Document-
International Framework 
For Liquidity Risk Measurement, 
Standards and Monitoring 
A. Introduction 
The Basel Conu1uttee's recem focus is reflected 
through irs goals of not o nly imensifying the " resilience 
of imernationally active banks ro liquidity stresses", but 
also intensifYing imernational harmoJusa tion of liquidity 
risk supervision. These efforts are aimed at consolidat-
ing recent work which culminated in the issue of the 
Principles for Sound Liq uidity R isk M anagement and 
Supervision .69 
As part of measures aimed at facilitating " furr.her 
consolidat.ion and promo tion of consistency in inter-
national liquidity risk supervision", and in response ro 
the " inaccurate and ineffect.ive managemenr. of liquidity 
risk" -such ineffect.ive management being a prominenr. 
fea ture of t.he financial crisis, the Basel Conmuttee has 
developed a minimum set of mo nitoring rools to be used 
in the "ongoing moni toring of the liq uidity risk expo -
sures of cross border inst.iwt.ions and in conununicat.ing 
these exposures among;t home and host supervisors."70 
This paper is strucmred in accordance with idemi-
fied components which are considered to be essential 
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to the successful implemenrat.ion of the (two fold) 
to pics of discussion of this paper, namely, moni tor-
ing and liq uidity risk measurements. The importance 
of successfi.illy conununicat.ing resulrs o btained from 
moJuto ring and measuring such risks, and the role of 
corporate governance in ensuring such effect.ive com-
munica tion, const.itutes a recurring theme thro ug hout 
this paper. The identified compo nents are as follows: 
(i) Corporate governance (ii) !merna! controls (iii) 
Disclosure (iv) Managemenr. of risk (v) Substance over 
form (vi) Transparency. 
As well as highlighting the interdependence of these 
components, the paper also aims to accentuate the 
importance of individual components. W hilst no hier-
archy of im porrance is assigned to these compo nents, 
corporate governance and internal controls are tvvo 
components which are analysed in grea ter depth (t.han 
o ther components). Furthermore, corpo rate governance 
could be accorded a status of greater importance t.han 
inr.ernal com.rols having regard to the fact that whilst 
inr.ernal controls relate to a very vital conr.rol aspect 
of an orgaJusa tion, corporate governance relates ro all 
processes- be it decision making, control, product.ion, 
performance, within a company/ bank. 
D isclosure and transparency embody the same goals, 
whilst t.he effective management and measurement of 
risks, and liquidity risks in particular, are aims which the 
inr.ernal control funct.ion and management sho uld st.rive 
to achieve. The theme "substance over form" dravvs 
attemion ro creative accounting practices and the need 
for greater emphasis o n principles based regulat.ion . 
Creat.ive accounr.ing and "window dressing" of figures 
in the financial statements are ever recurring issues 
arising from corpo rate collapses- as also recently high-
lighted by t.he recent crises which involved Lehman 
Bro thers. 
W hilst t.he danger of fo rmalism lies in t.he exercise 
of "creat.ive compliance",71 inherent problems of anti 
formalism are considered to include:72 
• The fact that cit.izens have t.he right to know exactly 
what is prohibited in advance of behavio ur rather 
than in ret.rospect 
• That broad rules are imprecise and over inclusive 
• That anti fo rmalism could result in ineffective con-
trol- where it is impossible ro implement 
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Principi<:S based regulation (PBR) is more advanta-
geous than a rules based approach--owing to the fact 
d1at ofTbalance73 sh eet llebt could result from the direct 
application of rules-without bemg able to consider 
d1e substance o f the trans.1cuon and because the imple-
mented standards do not allow such consideration . :\ s 
its secondary argumcm74. dus paper will seek to dem-
onstrate that d etailed rules could snll operate within a 
system of prmc1ples based regubuon--whilst enabling 
a consideration of the substance o f d1e transactions 
wluch are mvolvcd. 
R egulato ry standard; imple mented by the Basel 
Committee in its recent docume nc75 provide for 
"jurisdictio n-specific conditions"-for example, the 
perccnwge o f potential run-off of retail deposits which 
is partia lly dependent o n the structure of a jurisd ic-
tion's deposit insurance scheme.''7o Furthe rmore, the 
Committee highlights that " in these cases, the param-
eters sho uld be t ransparent and clt'arly outlined in the 
regulations of each jurisdicrion.''77 It also adds that this 
would provide clarity both with in the jurisdiction as 
well as across borders concerning the precise param-
eters that the banks arc capwring in these metrics, and 
that there w:~s need for public disclosures in respect o f 
regulatory standards. 78 
Good corporate governance would "provide proper 
1ncenuve> for the board and management to pursue 
obJectives that arc 111 the uueresrs of the company and 
Its sharcholders."7'! The dual faceted aspects of corpo-
rate governance relate nor only to the accountab1hty of 
management to shareholders, but also to the supe rvision 
and momtortng o f management pe rformance. Good 
corpo rate governance should faci litate effective mo ni-
to ring, eflective management of internal controls and 
risks, effective d isclosure and transparency. 
In considering the to pics of discussion, namely, 
liquidity risk measllrcnH.'Ilts and moni to ring, this paper 
wi ll commence with a sectio n dedica ted to liquidity 
1·isk (and risk measurements), along with developments 
which have triggered the need fo r particular monitor-
ing tools-both in response to global developments and 
with pnrticular reference to the increasing prominence 
ofliquidiry risb . 
The <.>ver growing prommcnce and importance 
of hquuhty 111 prudential superv1sion constitutes a 
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viwl reason which justifies the need for a prudential 
supervisory framework which docs no t merely (a nd 
excessively) rely on capital adequacy requirements 
wid1in such a framework. 
Some arguments wh1ch re1•olvc around the mad-
equacies of capital adequacy standal'lb 1nclude the fact 
that:80 
"Capital ratios may be o f limited value as mchca-
tors of actual risk smcc reported capital posiuons 
do not reflect the reJ I causes o f most bank failures 
( the real causes o f bank fa ilures being fraud or 
£1st de pletion of the banks' resomces) . T he inte r-
natio na l minimum ration o f eight percent lacks 
any theoretical j ustificatio n. Risk re lated measure-
me nt of bank assets is no t o nly deeply flawed, but 
also trigge rs substantia l disto rtions in the relative 
demand fo r bank assets. Since banks are in direct 
comperition with investment firms, so f.1 r as seCll -
riries activities are concerned, the imposition of 
capital burdens on banks erodes their abili ty to 
compete." 
Paragraph 56 of th r B:~sel Committee on Banking 
Supervision's Principles for Sound L1q111d1ty Risk 
Management and Supuv1s1on states that 
' 'A bank sho uld have a reliable management Infor-
mation system des1gned to prov1de the board of 
d1Cectors, sen10r man~gement and other appropnate 
pers01md w 1th runely and forward-lookmg Infor-
mation o n the hquid1ty pos1t1o n of the b:utk. The 
m.111agement info rmation syste m should have the 
ability to calculate liql1id1ty pos1tions 1n aU o f the cur-
re ncies in which the b.mk conducts business-bo th o n 
a subsidiary/ branch b:sis in all jurisdictio ns in which 
the bank is active and 0 11 an aggreg.1te g ro up basis. It 
sho uld capmre all SO lll'Ces o f liq uidity risk, inc luding 
contingent risks and the related triggers and those aris-
ing fro m new acti viticl, and have the ability to de li ver 
more granular and time sensitive info rmatio n during 
stress events. To effectively manage and monito r its net 
fi111din g requirements, a bank sho uld have the ability 
to calculate liquidi ty posi tions on :111 intraday basis, on 
a day-to-day basis for the shorter time ho rizons, and 
over a series of more dista11t rune periods thereafter. 
The management informauo n system should be used 
in day-to -day llqllldlf'/ n sk management to mo1utor 
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compl1ance with the bank's established pollc1es, proce-
dures and limits."BI 
B. Liquidity Risks 
h. February 2008. the Basel Conunittee on Banking 
Supervision published a paper titled "Liquicity Risk 
Management and Supernsory Challenges", a paper 
which highlighted the fact that many banks had 
ignored the applicauon of a number of ba;ic prin-
Ciples of ilqu1d1ty mk management during periods of 
abur:dant liquid1ry.82 An extensive review of its 2000 
"Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking 
Organisations'' \'V:IS also carried out by the Basel 
Committee as a means of address ing matters and issues 
ar ising from the financial market~ and lessons fro m 
the Financial Crises.BJ In order to consolidate on the 
Basel Comm ittee for Banking Supervision's Principles 
.f<>r Sou11d Uq11idity Risk Mallt[~emerrt a11d Supi'rllisioll of 
Scptrmbcr 2008, which ~hou ld lead to improved man-
agement and supervisi011 ofliguidity risks of individual 
banks, supervisory bodies wi ll be required" to develop 
tool! and policirs to address the pro cyclical behaviour 
of liquidity at the aggreg.1te levt>J.84 
T1r~ PrinriJ>Irs }11 &111nd Uquidil)' Risk Mmrag.>lll£'111 and 
SuJ>rrl'ision of Srptt>mber 2008 are armed at providing 
"consrstent supervrsory expectations" on principal ele-
mems such as "board and scruor management O\'Crsight; 
the establishment of pohc1es and nsk tolerance; the use 
of hqmd1ty nsk management tools such as conprehen-
sive cash flow forecasting. )units and liquidity scenario 
stress tcsnng; and the maunenance of a sufficient cush-
ion of l11gh qual1ty l1qu1d assets to address comingem 
liquidity needs."85 
The three aspects to pro cyclicality8L-as highlighted 
in the Impact Assessment Document amending the 
Capital R.egu iremcnt~ Directive, have the pmential to 
trigger a chain reaction. Starring wi th remuneration 
schemes, the impact of these 011 management incen-
tivrs. could have a positiw or negative effect on bank 
regulations (such as Basel II or the CR.D). Such regu-
lations could then mitigate or exacerbate pro cyclical 
r ffrcts~depending on the effectiveness of capital ade-
quacy ru les. A positive effect of such ru les wou.d reduce 
the tendency of banks to cur back on lending during 
economic "busts" whil1t incentives to retain liquidity 
would be increased-hence reducmg the likelihood of 
the occurrence of matunty 1111smatches. 
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The link between liquidity and Sy'Stemrc risks as 
illustrated in the ECB's Financial Stabili ty Review. is 
attributed ro the "desrrucrbn of spec1fic knowlcdge87 
wluch banks ha\'C about therr borrowers and the 
reduction of the common pool of llqllldlty:'88 The 
importance of the link ~rween llqmthty risks and 
systemic nsks w1tlun thr bwkmg sector 1s h1ghllghted 
by the consequences ::mnbutcd to the reluctance of 
banks to retain liquidity-given the cost of holding 
liquidity. 89 The conscqucnnal shortfalls of l1qu id-
iry as reflected by on and off balance sheet maturity 
mismatches accentuates the importance of the role 
assumed by central banks in the fund ing of bank bal-
ance sheets.90 
T he link between liquidity and systemic risks is also 
accentuated under paragraph 77 of the BCBS Pri11dplrs 
for Sottlld Uqttidity Risk MrKrut~t·nrrrrl mrd Sttpervision of 
September 2008. Principlc fl states that: 
"A bank should acti vely manage its intraday liquid-
ity positions and risks to m~et payment and settlement 
obligations on a timely bam under borh normal and 
srressed conditions and thm contnbLHe to the smooth 
functioning of payment and settlement systems.'' 
Paragraph 7791 elaborates on dus by hrghhghttng 
the reasons why "inrraday liquidity management" con-
snrutes an unportant component of a bank's "broader 
liquidity management strategy." It goes on to state that 
a bank's failure to manage intraday hqLudlty effectiwly 
could result in its mab1llty to meet payment obligations 
as they fall due,-hence generating consequences, not 
only for its own liguidiry pcsition. but also that of other 
parries. It illustrates how tlus could occur in two ways, 
namely: 
"The fact that that coumcr parties may view the 
failu re to settle payments when expected, as a sign of 
financia l weakness-which in turn could result not only 
in payments to the bank being delayed or withheld, but 
also in further aggravation of liquidity pressures. 
It also could leavt.' coumcrpartics unexpectedly short 
of funds, impair those comlterparties' ability to meet 
payment obligations, and disrupt the smooth fun c-
tioning of payment and settlement systems. Given the 
interdependencies that l'xi;r among systems. a bank's 
failure to meet certam cr neal payments could lead 
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to liquidity dislocations that cascade quickly across 
many systems and msntuttons. If nsk controls are over-
whelmed, these dtslocattOtlS could alter many banks' 
imraday or owrmght fumlmg needs. including their 
demands for central bank credtt, and potenually affect 
conditions in money markets. The J elay of other less 
cnucal payments also nught cause other institutions 
to postpone thetr own payments, catt.e many banks to 
face increased uncertainty about their overnight ftmd-
mg needs and potentially increase the impact of any 
operational outages." 
Liquidity is considered to be " highly procycli-
cal, growing in good times and d~ying up in rimes 
of strcss."92 During the build up to the present crisis, 
banks and other financial institutions had an incentive 
to minimise the cost of holding liqtiidity.93 Given the 
fact that liquidity could also be pro cyclical and given 
its ro le in the recem cri>is, perhaps four dimensions 
to pro cyclicality should l1ave been imrodtlced in the 
Impact Assessment Document94 amending the Capital 
R equirements Directive--incorpomting liquid ity as a 
fourth h<."ading. 
T he growing importance of formalisation within the 
bank regulatory framework ts also attributed to the gaps 
wluch extst wnhm a dtscrettonary based system of bank 
supervision-as was revealed tn the alternuth of Baring 
Pic's collapse. The recent crtsts has also lughhghted the 
need for formal rtsk a:.sessment modeb-as demon-
strated by the demise of Lehman Brothers where the 
fatlures of auditors to detect balance sheet irregularities 
(owing to creative accounting pmctices) \V:ts brought 
to light. 
The for mal framework for the menmrement of 
capital adequacy at European Community level, as 
exemplified by the lmernational Convergence of 
Capital McasuJ·emcnts and Capital Standards(Revised 
Framework), namely 13ascl 2, is to be commended, not 
only bec~use of"the need for a comistent framework 
for the reporting and comparative analysis of bank 
capital positions, the demand of regulated instimtions 
for transparency and equality in the application of 
regulatory standards'', but also because of" the exigen-
cies of the imernanonal convergence process- which 
requires the transparent and uniform implementa-
tion of harmon1sed rules by the regulators of every 
country."95 
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As parr of measures aim<."d at consolidating and 
"promonng consistency m unernanonal hqmdtty nsk 
supervision", and in response to the "maccurate and 
ineffectiw management of ltqutdtty nsk "-as was 
pronunendy htghhghted dunng the recent finannal 
crisis, the Basel Committee ha:. developed a "nunJmtun 
set of monitoring tools to be used 111 the ongomg 
monitoring of the hqutthty nsk exposures of cro5s bor-
der institutions and in conununicaung these exposures 
amongst home and host supervtsors."'l!> 
The Liquidity Coverage R.atioq7 and the Net Stable 
Funding R.atio98 arc two regulatory standards for 
liquidity risk which serve the pu1·pose o.>f attaining the 
objectives of " promoting short-term resiliency of the 
liquidity risk profile of institutions" (by ensuring that 
they have adequate high quality liquid resomces to 
survive during periods of extreme stress which last for 
about one month) and "promoting res iliency over lon-
ger-term periods" ( through the crea tion of additional 
incentives for banks to fund their activities with more 
stable sources of funding on an ongoinj:; basis),'!') 
In addiuon to the above-menttoned standards, the 
Basel Conunittee recommends that supervtsors also 
implement designated momtonng tools on a consistent 
basis. Such monnonng tools, along Wtth the standards, 
are intended to provide superviSors wtth mformauon 
which should a1d their assessment of ltqmdtty nsks 
attributed to a particular bank.IOO These monttor-
ing tools include: Contractual Matun ty Mismatch. 
Concenrranon of Funding, Available Unencumbered 
Assets and market-related monitoring tools.IOI 
C. Disclosure 
As well as the need for greater foe us on liquidity 
risk, there is also the need for greater reliance on dis-
closure requi rements. T his will be f.1ci li tated through 
an efiective monitoring process whc rcby identified 
risks are effective ly communicated across all levels of 
management. 
Enhanced rransparency does not only have the 
potential to "improve an understanding of the mecha-
nism at play in srrucrured finance", but also facilitate 
the idemification of risks and ensure that nsks are well 
controlled. 102 Risky loans which were "repackaged and 
sold to institution:~! invcsrors"--some of whom did not 
fitlly comprehend the 1111phcanons of the rransacttons 
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they were engaged 111 (or abo ut to be engaged in) , and 
the mherem n skl as~oc1ated With those tr:tnsactio ns, are 
co1ts1dercd ro be contnburory factors to the 2007 /(f) 
Fmanc1.1l Cn sLs. IOJ 
R egulators w1ll be able to gam greater access to 
v iral information wluch 1s rcqu1red for effective per-
form:mce of their funcr1ons where duties are imposed 
o n third p:lrtics, such as external auditors. in relatio n to 
the disclosure o f informatio n which is necess.1ry and 
requ tred for the efficient perfo rmance o f the regulato rs' 
a ctivities-as o pposed to a right to repo rt . 
T he relationship between supe rvisory auth or ities 
a nd the extcmal auditors o f a credit institution and the 
clu tie> o f thc~c :w ditors wa; identified as an impo rtant 
lesson from the BCCI case. I04 Because o f altdito rs' 
access to fi nanc ial ltndcrtaking;;' accoun ts and other 
csscnr ia l documc ms and info n natio n, they assume a viral 
positio n in the overa ll supe rviso ry process. An a nalysis 
o f BCCI revealed that measures, additional to those 
a lready existing, needed to be taken to eliminate the 
o paqueness of finan cia l structures and strengthen. coop-
era non between all bodies or persons involve d in the 
supervisio n o f such complex financial structures. lOS 
As a rc.>sult, the Basel Conmurree for Banking 
SuperVLSIOII ISSued "nununum standal'<h" which lay 
d own rules for effective consoltdated supervisio n and 
cooperatio n between supervisory authorities. This \vas 
nor only aimed at strengthening international co 
o peration between prudenttal supervisors. but also to 
improve transparency of financial , and in par ticu lar. 
g ro up srrucntres. 
D. The Importance o f Effective Management 
of Internal Controls 
"Danb identified as having control p roblerns have 
been characterised by o rganisatio nal structures in which 
respo mibilities were no t c leal'ly defin ed : he nce ( l) No 
senior managctncnt monito red the performance o f 
activities (carried out with in the o rg.1nisario n) c losely 
to observe un usual acti vities (2) No senio r manageme m 
had a comprehe nsive understanding ofrhe ac tivit ies and 
how profi ts were being generated." I06 
T he collapse of Barin~ in l995 which was am ibuted 
not only to lack of qua lity and employee deceptio n, also 
brought the ISsue of mremaJ controls and management 
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systems to the fore. I07 Barings collapse illustrated weak-
nessc.>s rn the bank regulator's supcrVLSory regune--which 
included flaws wttlun Its evaluation o f mtcrnal controls 
ar banks, flaws mherent tn the mternal commurucat1on 
withjn levels of management o f rhe bank regula tor. and 
rhe weaknesses in rhe way rhe bank regulator's ext<;ttng 
rules were applied. lOS 
T he Basel Committee categorised tnto five g roups. 
types of control breakdowns which are character istic o f 
ail ing banks and these are as fo llows: 109 
Lack of adequate manageme m ove rsight and account-
ability, and f.1 ilure to develo p a stro ng control cultu re 
withjn the bank 110 
Inadequate recognitio n nnd assessme nt o f the risk 
o f certain banking activities, whethe r 0 11 o r o fr ba la nce 
sheet 
T he absence or f.1 il ure of key cont rol structures 
and activities such as segrega tion o f duties, approvals, 
verifications, reconciliations and rcvie\'v'S of operating 
performance 
Inadequate communication of m formanon between 
levels of management w1rlun the bank-particularly 
rhe conununicanon of tnfo rmauon to lugher ranked 
officials (senior management) 
Inadequate or Ineffective audit pro-
grammes and monitoring activities 
E. The Contribution o f Corporate Governa nce 
to an Effective System o f Internal Controls 
Various corpo rate collapses have resulted 111 changes to 
financial reporting, corporate govc rnat·Jce and audic.lll 
T he e mphasis on internal cont ro l> ami risk manage-
ment e merged fro m realisatio n that due co change in 
the business enviro nmc m, even cfTcctiw safeguards may 
be insufficiem to clim innte all possib ilitic> of f.1ilu re. 11 2 
Kcasy and Wrig ht de fine corpo rate governa nce 
as the "examinatio n o f the strucrures and proct"sses 
associated with prod uction, decisio n making, control 
and so on within an orga nisa tion." I 13 T he two aspects 
of governance are considered to be i) Supervision 
and monitoring of managemem perfo rmance (the 
enterprise aspect) and ti) ensuring accountability of 
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management to shareholders and other stakeholders 
(the accountability aspctt).114 
The feedb.1ck effec!S of corporate gowrnance into 
the ltqllldtry and systemtc nsk mechamsms ae illus-
trated thus: 
"Poor corporate go,•ernance may comrib1 te to 
bank f.1alures, whtch could pose stgnificant publtc 
C<l6ts and consequences due to rhetr potential 
impact on any applicable deposit imur:mce sys-
tems and the possibility of broader macro eco-
ncmic implica tions, such as contagion ris~ and 
impact on payments systems. Furthermore, poor 
corporate governattcc could result i11 markets los-
ing confidence in the ability of a bank to properly 
mmagc its assets and liabilities, including deposits, 
which could in turn , trigger a bank run or liqlt id-
ity crisis."11 5 
As well as a robust system of internal controh (which 
incorpomtes internal ami external audit functions), the 
implementation ofi) corporMe va lues, codes of :on duct, 
standards of appropriate behavt OLtr and the system used 
in ensuring compliance w1th these, ti) a clear allocation 
of mponsibilirics and dcmion making authorities, iii) 
the establishment of a system wluch would guarantee 
eflic1~nt mteracnon and collaboration between the 
board of directors, selllor management and auditors, and 
iv) special mon1tormg of m k exposures where conflic!S 
of interest are likely to be high. arc considered to be 
cruc1al to ensur1ng that sound corporate governance 
oper:.res withm an org:ultsanon.l lo 
Furthermore. sound corporJte governance practices 
are considered to require " appropriate and effective 
legal, regubtory and institutional foundations." ll7 Even 
though factors such as the system of business laws and 
accounting standards which prevail in re;pective juris-
dictions are comidcred to be Gctors which operate 
beyond the scope ofba 11 ki ng supervision, the inclusion 
of four important forms of oversight are considered suf-
ficient not only in ensuring that appropriate checks and 
bab11ces exist, but that an effective sy-stem of corporate 
governance can be achieved. liB The types of oversight 
include: 
"(I) oversi!!)n by the board of directors or super-
vi;ory board: (2) oversight by individuals nor 
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invoked in rhe day-to-<.by running of the vari-
ous business areas; (3) direct line supervision of 
differem business areas; ami (4) tndependent risk 
management, compliance and audtt funcnons. In 
addition, It IS unportanr t'lat key personnel are fit 
and proper for the1r jobsK"11 D~ 
The conrribunon and t~e role assumed by semor 
management in ensurmg :hat Internal control sys-
tems are effectively managed, IS retlected through 
the Principles for the Assessment of lntcrn:U Control 
Systems. 120 The importance of monitoring and the 
rectification of de ficiencies within internal control sys-
tems is reflected under prinCiples 10- 12.121 Principle 10 
highlights the importance of mo11itoring on a frequent 
and ongoing b:JSis whi lst principles J l and J 2 draw 
m ention to the importance of effective collaborotion 
and commLmica tion between highl y tmined competent 
staff, the board of direc tors, audit committees and senior 
managemen t . 122 
According to paragmph 84 of the BCBS Pri11ciplrs 
for So1111d fgqt~iditFD Risk Mr.llf!Cflllcrtl tmdS11prrrrisio11 of 
September 2008, internal coordmatton across business 
lines is vital towards ensurmg that effecuve controls 
over liquidity outflows are achicvcd.I2J In relation to 
examples of actions wh1ch supervtSors could adopt . 
as means of respondmg to banks \\lth ltqmdtty nsk 
management \veaknesses or excessl\"e ltqmd1ty mk, that 
which "require. actions by the bank to strengthen its 
management of liquidity risk through unprovcments in 
internal policies, controls or repornng to semor manage-
ment and the board" IS constdered to have the greatest 
potential to address deficiencies in a bank's liquidity mk 
managemem process or liqLIIdity position.124 
As observed by the B:.scl Committee, 125 " most 
banks that have experienced losses fl·om internal con-
trol problems did not effective ly monitor their internal 
control systems. Often the >ystcms did not have the 
necessary built- in ongoing monitoring processes and 
the separate evalltations performed were either not 
adequate or were not ac ted upon appropriately by 
management." l26 Furthermore it highl ights that such 
f."lilures to monitor adequately commence wi th a "fail-
ure to consider and react to day-to-day information 
provided to lme managcn·em and other personnel 
indicating unusual actiVlry-such as exceeded expo-
Sltre limilli, customer accounts 111 propnetary business 
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acr.ivir.ies o r lack of current financial statements from 
bo rrowers." l27 
In imple me nting the regulatory standards and mo n-
itoring tools w hich are highlighted by rhe Basel 
Committee in irs consulr.arive document, 128 a supervi-
sory approach which no r incorporates rhe expertise of 
exte rnal audirors, bm. which is also mo re inclined to an 
o n sire system based approach is recommended . In sup-
po rting this view, refe rence is made to lessons learned 
fro m the co llapse o fBarings where it was noted by the 
Treasury Committee that "it was due ro rhe discretio n-
ary basis of rhe supervisors approach to supervision that 
there was limited ability to detect events at Barings." 129 
The regulatory standards and mo nitoring tools set 
o ut in the fl[S Consultative DoclUne nt1 30 are there-
fo re suppo rted on rhe basis o f their ability to facilitate 
a mo re formal approach to supervisio n which wo uld 
red uce the scope fo r flexibility (scope for creative 
accounting practices and "window dressing" of balance 
sheet figures) wh ere an on--sire approach to supervi-
sion is implemeJu ed. 
F. On site and Off-site Supervision 
Principle 2'l of the Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Supervisio n, Supervisory Reporting states that 
"Supervisors must. have a means of collecting, review-
ing and analysi11g prudential repo rts and statistical 
returns fro m banks o n borh a solo and a consolidar.ed 
basis, and a means of indepe nde nt ve rifica tion o f these 
repo rts, thro ugh e ithe r o n-sire examinatio ns or use o f 
exte rnal experts." 
According to Vieten131 bank regulatio n has followed 
two tre nds, namely: supervision has become increas-
ingly formalized and depe ndent o n quantitative tools, 
and secondly, regulatory dmies are being pushed down 
a regulato ry pyramid to include external aud itors and 
to enlist the resources o f reguhtees. 
External audito rs, even tho ugh they do not constitute 
by definition, part o f a banking organisa tion, immensely 
impact the quality of internal controls " thro ugh their 
audit activities-which also includes discussions with 
management and recommendar.ions for improvement 
to internal controls:' 132 "External auditors provide an 
impo rtant feedback on the effecr.iveness of rhe internal 
contro l sysr.em."lj3 
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Off site supervisio n is syno nymous with mo niroring 
and involves the regulator's use of external auditors' 
expertise. It also involves rhe receipt and analysis of 
financial stateme nts and statistical re turns submitted 
to the supervisors. Off sir.e monito ring ofte n has the 
benefits of being able to ide ntify po te ntia l problems, 
partic ularly during inte rvals between o n- sire inspec-
tio ns, thereby providing early detection and acting as 
trigge r fo r corrective actio n befo re proble ms become 
mo re se rio us. 134 
O n site work is usually do ne by the examinatio n 
staff o f the bank supervisory agency or commissioned 
by supervisors but may be undertaken by external 
audito rs. Furthe rmo re, it is contended that on-site 
examinations are freque ntly imple me nted by banking 
supervisory autho rities which posses the legal basis o r 
o ther arrangements to direct the scope o f the work car-
ried out by external audito rs. l35 
O ngoin1g monitoring is contrasted with separate 
evaluatio ns. lr is highlighted that whilst ongoing 
monito ring activities no t only provide the advantage 
of" quickly detecr.ing and correcr.ing deficiencies in the 
system", but are also most effecr.ive "when the system 
ofinr.erna l contro l is integrar.ed into the o pe rar.ing e nvi-
ronment and produces regular re po rts for review;' that 
separate evaluatio ns usually der.ect problems "only after 
the f.1cr." IJ6 However separat.e eva luatio ns also offer the 
advan tage of providing an organisatio n with "fresh and 
compre he nsive" insight into the effective ness of moni-
to ring activities--such activities be ing undertake n by 
staff from different departments which include the busi-
ness functio n, UJlancial control and internal audit.137 
G. Monitoring Compliance and Enforcement 
Principles Based Regulation 
A discretio nary based approach to regulatio n, whilst 
e ncouragvng g reater possibilities fo r regulato ry capture, 
appears to be more congruent with principles based 
regulation . However it is possible to impleme nt a sys-
tem of regulation which combines increased formalised 
procedures and/or detailed rules-whilst giving due 
consideratio n to the substance of transactions. 
"Principles provide the framework in which fir ms 
can organize their own processes to achieve the o ut-
comes the regulato r seeks-the regular.or in turn, 
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depends o n firms to adopt an attitude to t.he regulato ry 
regime (which is o ne which aims to go beyond min i-
mal compliance with rules):' l38 
Principles based regulation is no t o nly ad v:Jntageous 
because it allows nunageme nr. of a bank o r firm to r.a ke 
into consideration the substance of t ransactio ns, but 
because "principles impose o utcomes to be achieved-
no t detai led processes for achiev ing the m." 139 As well 
as being linked to met.a regulat.io n, principles based 
1·egulation £1cilitatcs a system whereby princip lcs"com -
municate regulatory object.ives and promote behavio ur 
which will ac hieve those objectivcs." l40 
Principles based regulatio n, thus, would no t o nly 
reduce the scope fo r "crea tive compliance "'-.-,since t he 
substance of transa ctio ns sho uld be considered by man-
agement, but also has the benefi t of providing a mo re 
flexible and respo nsive approach r.o regular.io n as the 
subscqucm scctio1~ will seck w de monstra te. 
Princip les based regulation is conside •·ed ro comprise 
of 3 elements, namely: 141 
• A particular ty pe of rule 
• A focus o n o utcomes and 
A foc us on senior management respo nsibility in 
ensuring these o utcomes are achieved 
Furthermore, three fo rms o f principles based reg u-
lation, namely: "formal pr incip les based regu latio n; 
substantive principles based regulation and full prin-
ciples based regul:uion", have been suggested .l42 For 
the purposes of this paper, focus will be restricted to 
substantive principles based regulatio n. 
Five classes of regulato ry practices which could charac-
terise substantive principles based regul:ttion inclllde: 1.43 
"The particular mode of inte rprer.ario n- that is, 
rhe approach taken in the interprerar.ive process; 
particular enforcement style; an o rientation to 
o utcomes; a relocatio n of responsibilities fo r 
worki ng our. the practica l applicatio n o f the pro-
visio ns; and an explicit and developed reliance on 
manageme nr. based regulation :' 
T he effectiveness of rules and regulatio n is depe n-
d em, no t o nly o n the mo nito ring processes and tools 
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used in suc h processes, but also the e ffecr.ive ness o f 
rhe e nfo rceme nt of rhose rules. For this reason, foc us 
will be dedicated to rhe second characteristic o f sub-
stantive p•·inc ip les based regulation- which is indeed 
a "critica l" and defming fea ture of principles based 
regulation . 
Accord ing to Blac k, the ado ptio n of the "respon-
sive" enforcement approach is j usti fied o n the bas is that 
" neither negor.iarive approaches nor deterrence based 
approaches arc effective o n their own and that instead, 
regulators sho uld implement a mixture o f both, that 
is, f1rst negotiate, rhen if ·rhe firm sri ll docs nor deliver 
substantive compliance, reg ulato rs sho uld g radually 
move up the e nforceme nr. pyramid, app lying sanc-
tio ns of increasing severity until it does."' l44 She adds 
weight r.o Baldwins argument145 by stating rhat "rhose 
who know what they are meant to be doing and are 
generally inclined to do it (" the well intenr.io ned and 
well in fo nncd") , arc bcs r dealt with using a nego tiat-
ing strategy- which is easier to do using principles. In 
contrast, those who do not know what they are meant 
to be do ing and even if they did, would no t be inclined 
to do it (" the ill intentio ned and ill informed") , are best 
dealt with using a strategy that escalates rapidly up the 
enforcement pyramid." l46 
T his "respo nsive" approach, it is further argued, " is 
not contingent o n any particula1· rule design and can 
operate in systems o f (i) highly detailed rules, (ii) where 
rhe ru les arc main ly principles, (iii) whe re rhere is a 
combination o f both ." l47 
Having conside red the fo rms, attributes and bene fits 
o f principles based regulatio n, the weaknesses inher-
ent in this ty pe of reguh rion are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, in relatio n r.o the all imporr.anr. aim of ensuring 
accountabi lity-which sho uld be fostered if adequate 
monitoring procedures <lire observed and carried o ut 
by rhe respo nsible levels of author ity. Pr incip les based 
regular.io n could serve as a hind rance tovvards ensuring 
accountabi lity. In this respect, re fere nce will be made 
to the seven paradoxes of principles based regularion-
wh ich are as follO\vs: 148 
"(i) T he inr.erpretative paradox : D ifferent inr.erpre-
tario ns att ributed to princip les could result in 
imprecise and general terms be ing accorded very 
specific intcrprcrario ns-cvcn though principles 
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are supposed to offer flexibility (where these are 
characterised by imprecise terms). 
(ii) The con1mnnicari ve paradox: Principles, whi lst 
f.1cilitating communicatio n, could also hinde r such 
communication. T he paradox is attributed to the 
distinctio n be tween legal use of language and irs 
ordinary use. 
(iii) The compliance paradox: Principles provide scope 
for flexibility in complianc~howeve r this could 
result in conse rvative and/or uniform behavio ur by 
regulated firms. 
(iv) T he superv isory and enforcement paradox: 
Principles require enforcement to provide them 
with credibility-however over-enforcement could 
result in their dem.ise. 
(v) The inte rnal management paradox: Principles based 
regulatio n has the potential to o f:le r required fJex-
ibiliry fo r internal conrrol syste ms to develop-and 
also the po te mial to overload them. 
(vi) Ethical paradox 
(vii)TrllSt. paradox 
A detai led cons ideration o f the above mentio ned 
paradoxes highlig hts the importance o f having a clear 
understanding o f the fo rm of principles based regula-
tio n w hic h is app licable w a particular bank o r business. 
As highliglued under the substantive principles based 
regulatio n, "those w ho know w hat. they are meant t.o 
be do ing and are generally inclined to do it ( the well 
intentio ned and well informed), are best dealt with 
using a nego tiating strategy:' He nce a mo re dracol!lian 
mode o f enfo rcem ent , that is to ugher sanct.io ns, wo uld 
no t be best suited in f.1cilitat.ing compliance by such 
groups--such sanctio ns being better reserved for the 
" ill informed and ill intentio ned:' Furthermo re, a to ugh 
punitive regime is o ne in which principles are unlllkely 
to survive-even tho ugh detai led rules could stiln be 
imple me nted under principles based regula.tio n.149 
Hence the desired level o f compliance required within 
a firm is best achieved hav ing regard to the organisatio nal 
stwcture which exists within an organisa tion-and 
to whether (as a result of a such determinatio n) , tim 
o rganisa tio n could be considered a suitable candidate 
fo r the app licatio n o f principles based regulatio n. C lea r 
delegatio n and segregatio n of duties within an o rganisa-
tio n would no t o nly pro mote accountabi lity, but wo uld 
also f.1cilirate a sys tem where principles could be app lied 
and also f.1cilirate mo nito ring procedures. Conseq ue ntly, 
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mo nito ring would also f.1cilitate accountability--since 
frequent reviews and discussio ns between manage-
ment and appropriate personnel sho uld increase an 
understanding o f the acr.ivities ca rried out by particular 
divisio ns within the o rga111isa tio n. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Mo nir.oring foste rs transpare ncy, which in turn 
foste rs accountability. M o nito ring of key risks, as 
well as periodic evaluatjons by the business lines and 
internal audit constitute a vital element of corporate 
governance-hence the overall effectiveness o f a bank's 
internal controls sho uld be monitored on an ongoing 
and frequeml SO basis. lSI 
Since it is possible fo r detailed rules to ope rate 
under pr inciples based regulatio n-and since detailed 
ru les constitute a vital e leme nt in ensuring that clea r 
delegatio n and segreg:uio n o f respo nsibilities exist 
within an organisation, it could be sa id that the level 
o f accountability de ri ved under princ iples based 
regulatio n is depende nt o n the fo rm o f principles 
based regulatio n . Unde r the fo rmal princip les based 
regulatio n, the level o f accountability de ri ved is li kely 
to be g reater than that derived under fu ll principles 
based regulatio n. ,-\s hig hlighted within the re levam 
sectio ns o f this paper, a n approac h whic h combines 
negotiating and punitive strategies is always considered 
best-owing to the leve l of flexibility o ffe red by such 
an approac h. However t.he o rganisatio nal structure, 
c ultme and severa l o the r f.1cto rs require consideration 
before substantive principles based regulatio n is judged 
to be the o ptimal approach . 
In accordance with Principle 13 o f the Principles fo r 
the Assessment o f lntemal Control Systems, "su pervi-
sors should require that :111 banks, regard less o f size, have 
an effective system of in te rnal contro ls that is consistem 
with the nature, complexity, and risk inherent in their 
o n- nnd- o ff balance sheet activities and that cor-
respo nds to the banks e nviro nment and conditions." 
Furthermo re, "in those instances where supervisors 
determine rhar. a bank's internal comrol syste m is nor. 
adequate o r effective fo r that banks specific risk profile, 
they sho uld take appro priate actio n." In accordance 
with Core Principle 1.7' of the Basel Core Principles 
fo r Effective Bank Supervision, l11temal co11trols aiJtl aut/it, 
specific attentio n sho uldl g iven to ensure the existe nce 
o f: (i)"clear arrangeme nts fo r delegating autho rity 
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and responsibility; (1i) separation of the functions that 
invoh·c comn11mng the bank, paymg away us funds, and 
accounting for 1ts assers and liabilities:· 
Where clear deleg,ltton of authority, segregation of 
resp011S1b1lmcs arc not ut place. the most appropriate 
and obvious acuon nught be to 1111t1ate a more deter-
rence based approach-rather than a negottati,·e based 
approach. However. reference must be made to factors 
highlighted under the fi rst paragraph of this conclusive 
section. 
Increased fo rmalisation under principles based regu-
lation would still allow for a consideration of the 
substance of rrnnsacrions-whilst allowing for flexibility 
in terms of its application. With regards to its applica-
tion, th is implies its suitabi lity as the appropriate mode 
of regula tion-based on the level of accountability it 
could provide an org.1nization with a11d whether an 
organization, because of its structure and cultu re, should 
consider applying it at all. 
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